United States v. Knotts by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons
Supreme Court Case Files Powell Papers
10-1982
United States v. Knotts
Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Fourth Amendment Commons
This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Powell Papers at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
U.S. v. Knotts. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 118. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee
University School of Law, Virginia.
' 
vf!S/e~ C/-t s ~~ 
Rtsf,,.,SI! Rf!c tic~'cl -
S ~ ovt Y' t PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
~~~~~--~~~~
May 20, 1982 Conference 












(Heaney, Peck~ ~ 
issenting in part~ 
~
KNOTTS Federal/Criminal '------ Timely 
- -
NOTE: This case is "curve-lined" with No. 81-6089, Petschen ___.. 
v. United States, in which a Preliminary Memorandum has already 
circulated. The two petitions arise from the same CAS decision, 
and the operative facts are the same. 
SUMMARY: The issue is whether the warrantless use of an 
electronic "beeper" to locate a can of chloroform transported to 
resp's property violated the Fourth Amendment. 
c,~R ~ I.~pvr~"'+ 
(\~ 
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FACTS: Petr and his co-defendant, Petschen, were part of an 
enterprise engaged in the manufacture of amphetamine. Police 
suspicion focused on the group's "chemist," Armstrong, due to his 
pilferage of "drug-precursor chemicals" from the 3M Co., his 
former employer. Further investigation indicated that Armstrong 
was involved in illicit drug manufacturing, and had been placing 
numerous orders for chemicals with the Hawkins Chemical Co. in 
Minneapolis. 
On Feb. 28, 1980, with the consent of Hawkins Chemical Co., 
police agents attached an electronic beeper to a can of 
chlorofoJm which Armstrong was scheduled to pick up from the 
company later that day. Armstrong picked up the chloroform and 
other chemicals as expected, and later transferred the chemicals 
to Petschen's car. Agents followed Petschen as he drove into 
Wisconsin, but lost sight of the car when Petschen began driving 
evasively. The agents also lost the beeper signal for about half 
an hour, but the signal was later picked up by a helicopter and 
the can of chloroform was determined to be on property 
surrounding a remote cabin owned by resp. The next day, resp and 
Knotts were observed leaving the property. 
~ 
Based on this information, Minn. and federal agents obtained 
a warrant to search the cabin and surrounding property. They 
discovered a clandestine drug laboratory in the cabin, and seized 
chemicals and equipment. The can of chloroform, on which the 
beeper had been placed, was found hidden under a wooden barrel 
outside the cabin. 
The DC (D. Minn., J. Alsop) denied a motion to suppress the 
evidence seized from the cabin. Resp and Petschen were both 
I 
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convicted of conspiring to manufacture controlled substances in 
violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ S4l{a) {1) & S46. 
HOLDING BELOW: The CAS reversed resp's conviction, although 
it affirmed the conviction of his codefendant, Petschen. Noting 
that other CAs had reached varying results regarding Fourth 
Amendment restrictions on the use of beepers to trace personalty 
other than motor vehicles, the CAS held that law enforcement 
officers must obtain a warrant before using a beeper to determine 
the location of noncontraband materials that have been placed in 
a private area or withdrawn from public view. See United States 
v. Bailey, 62S F.2d 93S, 944 {CA6 19SO); United States v. Moore, 
56 2 F • 2 d 1 0 6 , 113 { CA 1 19 7 7 ) , c e r t den i e d , 4 3 5 U • S • 9 2 6 { 19 7 S ) . 
Resp's cabin was a secluded and private area, and the chloroform 
drum was placed out of sight. As the owner and resident of the 
property, resp had "a reasonable, legitimate expectation of 
privacy in· the location of objects out of public view on his 
land," and the warrantless use of the tracing beeper thus 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. However, because Petschen 
could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the equipment 
of a clandestine drug laboratory on his coconspirator's property, 
the seized evidence was admissible against him. 
Judge Henley dissented in part. He maintained that the use 
of a beeper to monitor the location of a precursor chemical--
which, although not itself contraband, is clearly intended for 
use in the illegal manufacture of controlled substances--does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Perez, 526 
F.2d S59, S63 {CAS), cert denied, 429 u.s. S46 {1976). 
CONTENTIONS: The SG contends that this case presents an 
important question of Fourth Amendment law and that there is a 
- 4 -
direct conflict with decisions of the CAs 9 & 10. E.g., United 
States v. Dubrofsky, 5Sl F.2d 20S (CA9 197S): United States v. 
Clayborne, 5S4 F.2d 346, 350-351 (CAlO 197S). These decisions 
hold that, because beeper monitoring is merely an aid to visual 
surveillance and the intrusion occasioned by such monitoring is 
slight, beeper surveillance may be undertaken without a warrant. 
Cf. Moore and Bailey, supra, which reached a contrary conclusion. 
The decision below goes beyond Moore and Bailey, which involved 
the warrantless use of a beeper over an extended period to 
ascertain the continued presence of chemicals inside private 
premises. The CAS in this case held that the beeper could not be 
employed even to determine the arrival of the chloroform on 
resp's property: this conflicts with other CA decisions holding 
that the warrantless monitoring of a beeper to follow the 
movements of a vehicle does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
E.g., United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190 (CAS 1979): United 
States v. Michael, ·645 F.2d 252 (CAS 19Sl) (en bane), cert denied 
sub nom. Michael v. United States, No. Sl-112 (Oct. 19, 
19Sl) (Justice White, with Justices Brennan and Powell, 
dissenting). The decision below is also inconsistent with Smith 
v. Maryland, 442 u.s. 735 (1979), which upheld the warrantless 
use of a "pen register" to record the numbers dialed from a 
defendant's telephone. 
DISCUSSION: As the SG points out, there is a CA conflict 
concerning the validity of warrantless beeper surveillance. 
Although the Court recently denied cert in a similar case--
Michael v. United States, supra--this is an issue that the Court 
will probably have to take eventually. The legality of the 
installation of the beeper--at issue in some of the other CA 
I 
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cases--is not in dispute here, since the CAB held that attachment 
with the consent of 
1
the Hawkins Chemical Co. was proper. 
However, the Court may nevertheless want to grant, to consider 
the constitutionality of warrantless beeper monitoring. 
I recommend calling for a response with a view toward 
granting. 
The right to respond has been waived. 
May 12, 1982 Rosenblum Opns in petn 
' . 
The response does little to change 
the posture of the case as revealed 
by the petitions. There is a conflict 
over the main issue presented: 
whether the Fourth Amendment forbids 
warrantless "beel_>er" surveillance. 
Because of tlie 1m{>ortance of this 
)
'issue, I would Grant and Consolidate 
these two curve-lined cases arising 
from the same set of facts, Nos. 
81-1802 and 81-6089. ' 
• 
The one disadvantage of these cases 
is that there is here no 4th Amendment 
issue about the "installation" of 
the beeper. It was installed into a 
can , with the Rermission of the can's 
owner. Tfie Fourth TmendmenE question 
tnus arose only when the can was 
moved onto the defendants' property. 
As the more typical beeper case may 
involve direct installation of the 
beeper into property of the defendant 
himself, it arguably would be worth 
waiting for such a case. You certainly 
should consider this possibility. 
Because of the importance of the issue, 
however, it would be my inclination to 
GRANT these cases now and CONSOLIDATE 
them for argument. , 
f)~ 
June 17, 1982 
Court ................... . 'Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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United States v. Knotts 
From: Mark December 3, 1982 
Question Presented 
Whether warrantless monitoring of a beeper placed in noncon-





On June 14, 1979, a state narcotics agent was informed by 
the 3M Company that Tristan Armstrong, one of resp's codefen-
dants, had been stealing phenylacetone and other chemicals that 
are "precursors" (starter materials} in the manufacture of am-
phetamine and methamphetamine. Through visual surveillance, 
agents saw codefendant Darryl Petschen and others moving labora-
tory equipment and furniture from a residence in St. Paul, Minn., 
into a truck. A search of the vacated residence, conducted with 
the landlord's permission, revealed laboratory equipment and 
traces of a white powder that contained a byproduct of the am-
phetamine synthesis. 
The agents later learned that Armstrong had been ordering 
chemicals from the Hawkins Chemical Co. in Minneapolis. They 
conducted visual surveillance as Armstrong picked up boxes of 
chemicals from the company and took them to Petschen's house in -
Minneapolis. There the chemicals were transferred to Petschen's 
car, which Petschen then drove to a farmhouse in Scandia, Minn. 
On February 28, 1980, Armstrong was scheduled to pick up 
another order of chemicals, including a quantity of chloroform, 
from Hawkins Chemical Co. The company permitted the state agents 
to place the chloroform in a special five-gallon drum containing 
an electronic signal transmitter -- a "beeper" -- hidden in the 
v" bottom. On the delivery date, the agents used the beeper and 
visual surveillance to follow the progress of the drum. 
Armstrong took the packages of chemicals to Petschen's resi-
3. 
dence in the city, where they were put in Petschen' s car. An 
hour and a half later Petschen left, drove to his farmhouse in 
Scandia, then twenty minutes later resumed driving and l}..ea~ed 
into Wisconsin. During this time, the agents kept~termittent ~ 
visual surveillance 
~continuous contact. 
of the car, relying on the beeper to stay in 
At some point Petschen began making evasive 
maneuvers. The agents terminated their visual surveillance, then 
lost the signal. One hour later -- two hours after Petschen left 
the farmhouse -- a heliocopter located the beeper signal in the - ........, 
vicinity of a cabin occupied by resp Leroy Knotts near Shell 
Lake, Wisconsin. The agents established intermittent visual sur-
veillance of the property until the following day, when they saw 
resp and Petschen leave in Petschen's vehicle. 
Three days later federal and state agents executed warrants 
authorizing them to search Petschen's farmhouse and Knotts' cabin 
and surrounding property. They discovered a fully operable drug 
laboratory behind wall paneling in K~f cabin. In the labora-
tory were forumlae for amphetamine and methamphetamine, $10,000 
worth of equipment, and chemicals sufficient to produce 14 pounds 
of pure amphetamine. The agents found the five-gallon drum hid-
den under a barrel outside the cabin. 
B. Decisions Below 
Armstrong, Petschen, and resp were indicted on various drug 
charges. Armstrong pleaded guilty and testified against the oth-
er two. 
Prior to trial resp moved to suppress the evidence found 
I 
4. 
during the search of his cabin on the ground that the warrant was 
invalid because based on information derived from the warrantless 
use of the beeper. The v6c (D. Minn~ Alsop, J.) denied the mo-
tion. Pet. App. at 12a. It held that the company's consent val-
idated the installation of the beeper, and that resp "could not 
~-------------~---------------------~~ 
reasonably have expected to keep private the fact that the can 
had arrived at his residence." Pet. App. at 15a-16a (emphasis in 
original) . Resp and Petschen were convicted. Resp was sentenced 
to five years. 
v 
C. A i' "-_.~- /J 
~
PeL1pp. ~ A divided CAS panel reversed resp's conviction. 
at la. Judge Peck [CA6], joined by Judge Heaney, agreed with the ~-
DC that the beeper's installation was valid, stating "Caveat emp- ~ 
-----~.-. ..._.....-.~ 
tor." Id. at n.2. He then distinguished cases involving beepers 
on cars or in contraband, finding that "it would be a limitless 
expansion of police power to allow warrantless tracking of lawfu~ 
goods wherever an illicit use was suspected." Id. at Sa. The ~ 
-
crucial point was that the beeper had passed from the public 
sphere to the private sphere: 
When police agents track bugged personal prop-
erty without first obtaining a warrant, they 
must do so at the risk that this enhanced sur-
veillance, intrusive at best, might p ush for-
tuitously and unreasonably into the rivate 
s ere protec e our men en t. It 
so 1n 1s case, where t e eeper's signal 
was lost and found again only after the 
beeper-laden drum was on private property out 
of public view. (Pet. App. at 6a-7a.) 
Although resp' s conviction was reversed, Petschen' s conviction 
was upheld because Vpetschen had no standing to object to the 
search of Knotts' cabin. 
Judge Henley dissented from the reversal of resp's convic-
50 
tion. He objected primarily to the majority's inflexible dis-
tinction between contraband and noncontraband, arguing that the 
rationale underlying the contraband exception applies as well to 
these precursor chemicals: "[W]hen chemicals are purchased for 
such intended illegal use, the familiar warning cited by the rna-
jority in note 2, caveat emptor, might be well-taken." Pet. App. 
at lOa. In addition, 
v-
he noted that these precursor chemicals 
were subject to forfeiture under the Controlled Substances Act, 
---......... -
21 u.s.c. §881, a further indication that resp lacked a reason-
able expectation of privacy in them. 
CAs. 
The Court granted 
The Court denied 
cert to resolve a ~n 
Petschen's petition or cert in No. 




This is a vexing case. I have spent what probably is an 
inordinate amount of time on it, yet have been unable to satisfy 
~- myself that I have reached the proper conclusion. I hope this 
~ r ~a t:__ lea~t se~ forth ~eful analytical framewo.rk. My view 
~· is that the Government should be required, absent exigent circurn-
~tances, to obtain a warrant prior to using a beeper. My reading 
~~~dofesthis Court's cases, however, suggests that use of a beeper 
~:~ constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
P- A. Installing the Beeper 
A threshold issue that sometimes arises in this type of case 





is not raised here because the chemical company consented to ~ 
J-£t_ 
placement of the beeper in the drum. Su~h third-party consent~
normally is obtained when the Government places a beeper in a Uc•4~,_ 
.......__ .........--.... ___........, --
particular object. The other usual mode of installing a bee~
___________, <. €1 
is to place it on a moving vehicle. Most CAs have held that in-~ 
stallation of a beeper in these circumstances does not contravene ~ 
the Fourth Amendment. See Brief for US at 13 n.6 (citing cases). ~ 1 
~ 
There are no decipions on the validity of placement of a beeper 
on a person, nor any decisions dealing with illegal entry to in- ~f-
stall a beeper. ~ 
For present purposes, the only important point is that the 
third-party consent does not affect the remainder of the analy-
----------~~---------
sis. Even if the Government obtained consent from the owner of a --
pay telephone to install a recording device, the decision in Katz 
--,.._ ;r v. United States, 389 u.s. 347 (1968), still would protect the \,L.; tt'r 
J', phone user's expectation of privacy. Similarly, the central is-~~ 
~ JP. sue here is ~ab~~ o :_ resp's expectation that the ~ 
j/t£11""' Gover~ not u~eepers ~follow h~m and his prope_; ty 
a~d. The chemical company could not consent to the continuing 
"search" that allegedly occurred once the property containing the 
beeper was transferred to the purchaser. 
B. Does the Fourth Amendment Apply? [Tw-o ~ ~ 
There are two major issues: (1) whether use of a beeper is 
a "search" at all under the Fourth Amendment, and, if so, (2) 
whether a warrant must be obtained to use the beeper. I discuss 
the first issue here, and the second issue in part C. 
~)15:(~ 
observed ~at CAs have Judge Henley's dissent · correctly 
in these cases: "One analysis fo-
item containing the beeper. Under 
1tems may generally be monitored in public places, 
but monitoring may be prohibited after the i terns are withdrawn 
from public view. Another analysis focuses on th f the 
item containing the beeper. 
items may be monitored regardless of location, whereas most non-
contraband items may be monitored ' under the former analysis only 
if they are in a public location." Pet. App. at 8a-9a. I will 
use these analyses for p~rposes of discussion, though I will ar-
gue that both are dubious. 
1. The NATURE of the Item Containing the Beeper 
Several CAs have placed significance on the ~4:ype of objec t 
to which a beeper may be attached: (1) ~ontraband, (2) moving 
v(' 
~vehicles, and (3) lawfully-possessed property. For present pur-
poses, the important distinction is between contraband and other 
property . ......, N~ CA has held that monitoring a beeper placed in con-
traband violates the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States 
v. Bishop, 530 F.2d 1156 (CAS 1976) (beeper in money stolen from 
bank); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208 (CA9 1978) (beep-
er in heroin). The basic rationale is that no one may have a '14..-1> 
~)1. 
reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband. ~ 
There is no dispute that the chloroform contained in t~ 
five-gallon drum was not technically contraband. Its possession 
was not per se unlawful. But Judge Henley argued that the ratio-
nales underlying the contraband exception apply as well to "chem-
8 0 
icals intended for use in the manufacture of illegal drugs." 
Pet. App. at lOa. He noted that the chloroform was an essential 
precursor to the manufacture of amphetamine and methamphetamine. 
Moreover, the Controlled Substances Act, 21 u.s.c. §88l(a) (2), 
provides for forfeiture of any "raw material . . intended for 
use" in manufacturing controlled substances. In Judge Henley's 
view, these considerations clearly diminished resp's expectation 
of privacy with respect to the chloroform. The Government had 
probable cause to believe that the chloroform was "intended for 
use" in illegal drug manufacturing, and under the statute could 
have seized the chloroform without a warrant. 
This argument is somewhat attractive, but I believe it ~ 
should be rejected. First, difficult line-drawing problems will 
develop if the test is the likelihood that certain property will 
be used in a criminal endeavor. For example, where a doctor or 
chemist might have a legitimate reason to purchase certain chemi-
cals, it may be difficult to say whether the chemicals were in-
tended for illegal use. Furthermore, the very focus on the exis-
tence of probable cause to believe criminal activity is occuring 
suggests that without probable cause the police cannot act, which 
in turn means there is a search taking place. Thus, the probable 
criminal purpose for the chemicals relates not to the existence 
of a protected Fourth Amendment privacy interest, but the suffi-
ciency of the Government's reasons for overriding that interest. 
Second, there are difficult analytical problems with the 
~~~----------------------------- -
statement that "no one has a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
contraband." An individual's expectation of privacy is not sim------
9. 
ply in a particular piece of property. If the police without ) 
probable cause break into someone's home and discover heroi,n, the ( ~ 
is contraband. The same heroin will be suppressed even though it 
holds for contraband discovered during an unlawful search of a 
person or car or suitcase or any other location in which the per-
son has a reasonable expectation of privacy. It is not the Jcon-~ 
~ -~'' 
~d in which the person has a privacy interest, but r~er  
II "'-
the places in which he might keep the contraband or any object. ~ 
~ in this case the expectation of privacy relates t~~ 
person's movements and to the location of items at his residence. 
This expectation seems the same regardless whether the beeper is 
placed on his person, car, or lawful property or whether it is 
placed in contraband. Even if the chloroform was subject to for-
~ fei ture, therefore, that fact would not affect the question 
whether the police may use a beeper without regard to the Fourth 
Amendment. 
I recognize that there is historical support for the contra-
band distinction, but I always have had difficulty with it. One 
as easily could say that resp had no reasonable or legitimate 
expectation of privacy in a cabin that presumably served primari-
ly or exclusively as a clandestine laboratory for manufacturing 
illegal drugs. Cf. Pet. App. at 9a (Henley, J., dissenting). 
Yet the Court consistently has rejected the view that the conduct 
of illegal activity on searched premises defeats the occupant's 
in those premises. 
the Item Containin the Bee er 
The analysis, used by the court below and the 
lj-t!-~~~~ 
if-6 ~ ~~ ~ 10. 
"~--'~~....., .... ,..-4~~1r.~~~....-"'- e)GSS JJ& ~1-<J ~~ 
parties here, suggests that the critical question is where the 
beeper is located while being monitored. In particular, ~ 
question is whether the beeper is in "public" or "private." -tn!f lrY 
This analysis begins with the undisputed assertion that t~, 
Fourth Amendment does not apply to visual surveillance of a per-
son, a vehicle, or other object. When a person moves about in 
public, in a car or otherwise, he has no reasonable expectation 
that this movements will be unobserved. "What a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
This principle generally applies even where the Government makes ~~ 




From this the SG argues that use of a beeper to follow the 
movements of a vehicle does not constitute a search because no 
expectation of privacy is at stake. Resp does not contend other-
wise: "We . . agree that the warrantless use of a beep§.f to ~. 
. . 1 '11 f h d . 1 ass1st~~~ sqrve~ ance o anot er per~on oes not v1o ate a 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights." 
-----------~----------------
Brief for Resp at 18. 
Resp does contend, however, that monitoring a beeper that is on 
private premises implicate the Fourth Amendment. The CAS major- ~ 
ity emphasized that here "the beeper's signal was lost and found 
again only after the beeper-laden drum was on .E_r ivate property -
out of public view." Pet. App. at 7a. Resp also draws this dis-
tinction between the valid use of beepers for "surveillance as-
sistance" and their invalid use for "location monitoring," i.e., 
a beeper "to determine the (continued) presence of property 
11. 
which it is lawful to possess." Brief for Resp at 25. 
I do not think this distinction easily can be maintained. 
To be sure, it always is plausible under the Fourth Amendment to 
suggest a distinction between intrusions of public and private 
locations. The prevailing analysis focuses on "reasonable expec-
tations of privacy," and such expectations generally are greater 
in a private place such as a home than in a more public place 
such as a car. Few would suggest that the police violate the 
Fourth Amendment by using binoculars to identify persons or 
activities in an automobile in public, yet a violation may occur 
if binoculars are used to peer into a private home. Cf. United 
States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (CA2 1980) (warrantless use of 
telescope to identify objects in suspect's apartment violates the 
Fourth Amendment, where the objects otherwise would not have been 
identifiable to the public) • 
Resp raises an analogous argument here. Where the police ~­
conduct surveillance through a beeper, they simply are using an~ 
electronic means of doing what they could do visually. But when 
the police monitor the location of property (or presumably a per-
son) on private premises, they are using the beeper to do what 
they otherwise could not do without a search warrant: "enter" 
the premises to see if certain items are inside. One can con-
ceive of cases in which this might be true. For example, the 
police might place beepers in every drum of chemicals sold, not 
to follow a particular purchaser to a destination, but to allow 
the police to scan a large number of buildings to see if any of 
the drums ended up there. 
12. 
The problem is that this "visual surveillance"/"location 
monitoring" distinction breaks down in practice. A beeper's 
fundamental use is for tracking particular persons or items to a 
final resting point. Usually this resting point will be on pri-
vate property. Whether one calls this "surveillance" or a 
determination of "location," the SG is correct that "ascertaining 
the destination" of the vehicle or pa~kage "is the whole point of 
the exercise." Brief for US at 35. 
----=::> 
In this case, for example, the Government's purpose was to 
locate the clandestine laboratory. It would seem to matter lit-
tle as a practical matter whether the state agents were monitor-
ing the beeper at the precise moment the car arrived at the cab-
in, or whether they temporarily lost the signal and rediscovered 
it only after the drum containing the beeper had come to rest out 
of public view. It would be a fine distinct ion indeed to say 
that the intrusion on resp's privacy was greater in the latter 
situation. Yet this is precise basis on which this case was de-
cided. Resp and the CAS appear to concede that had the agents 
been tracking the beeper when it turned onto resp's property, the 
discovery of the destination would have been valid for use in 
obtaining a search warrant. 
I do not believe that the fortuity of whether the police 
happened to lose the beeper signal shortly before Petschen's car 
arrived at the cabin has any reasonable relationship to the exis-
tence of an intrusion on resp's Fourth Amendment expectations. I 
therefore would not adopt a rule distinguishing between monitor-




whether the monitoring constituted a search. In either case the 
purpose of the beeper monitoring is to discover where certain 
persons or items have gone. If the use of the beeper is not a 
search for purposes of "surveillance assistance," then it is not 
a search for the related purpose of "location monitoring." 
3. Beepers and "Expectations of Privacy" in the 
Movement and Location of Persons or Property 
In my view, the case turns on the validity of the SG's prop-
osition that use of a beeper to follow someone's public movements 
does not constitute a search. If this proposition is true, then 
------------------------------beepers do not fall within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. 
As noted above, the SG's argument is quite simple -- and -persuasive. When a beeper is used to track a ' 'i:>erson' ;! _gublic -
1 
. ,...., , 
ocat1on, 1t 
~
simply provides a _more efficient means of doing what 
the Government might do through visual surveillance or other "en-
hancement" devices such as bloodhounds or binoculars. Since a 
person's location generally is "knowingly expose[d] to the pub-
lic," Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, the beeper does not impinge on any 
privacy interests that visual surveillance does not. 
This argument has powerful support in the type of analysis 
employed in ~th v. Maryland, 442 U.S 735 (1979) (you did not 
participate) . Justice Blackmun held for the Court that use of a 
pen register -- a device that records the numbers dialed on a 
telephone, but does not monitor the contents of the communication 
-- was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. The arguments 
adopted by the Court are relevant here. 




the communications of the contents were not disclosed. A similar 
argument is made here that all the beeper says is "here I am." 
The beeper tells nothing else about what private activity is go-
ing on. (Note, however, that there is a type of beeper -- not at 
issue here-- that signals when a package has been opened.) Sec-
ond, the Court found that the phone user knowingly exposed the 
numbers dialed either to an operator or to the telephone 
company's capacity for routine monitoring. He therefore assumed 
the risk of disclosure to the police. A similar argument is made 
here that when a person moves about in public, he assumes the 
risk that his whereabouts will be observed by the police. Final-
ly, the Smith Court rejected the argument that since the phone 
company did not in fact routinely record the numbers of the type 
of local call that Smith had made, he had a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy. It sufficed that the phone company could have 
recorded the information. Similarly, the SG argues that it does 
not matter, as the CAS thought it did, that the police did not 
actually see Petschen's car arrive at resp's cabin. Since the 
police could have watched the car arrive, resp "could not reason-
ably have expected to keep private the fact that the can had ar-
rived at his residence." Pet. App. at 15a-16a (DC opinion) (ern-
phasis in original). 
In short, the SG has persuasive arguments that under exist-
ing precedent monitoring a beeper simply enhances lawful methods 
I 
of surveillance and thus does not constitute a search. Nonethe-
less, a strong counterargument is possible. Quite candidly, this 
counterargument is premised primarily on the very efficiency of a 
15. 
beeper and the chi 11 ing prospects of its wide spread use by the 
Government. A Court holding that monitoring a beeper does not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment would mean that the Government may ;7 ~ 
-------------------------------use beepers on anyone for any reason. Any individual 
--------------~------------
unsuspectingly might carry around a beeper placed, say, in his 
shoe. Evidence of involvement in criminal activity would not be 
required prior to use of the beeper. This unrestrained power may 
implicate the privacy concerns that arise from the Fourth Amend-
ment. 
of 
The broadest possible argument against the unrestrained use ~ 
beepers is stated in Judge Keith's concurring opinion in ~~~ 
United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938 (CA6 1980): ~ 
·~-~ I would hold that privacy of movement itself 
is deserving of Fourth Amendment protections. 
A meaningful definition of privacy should in-
clude the control of the intimacies of person-
al identity. Obviously this control begins 
with one's body and at the very least extends 
to those elements which constitute one's exis-
tence as a sentient being. In this regard, I 
think an individual may legitimately expect to 
live in this society without fear that the 
government may be silently following his every 
movement. Sometimes we do not care if others 
know where we go or what we do. If someone 
follows us to work or to the grocery store, we 
may not be concerned. But each of us goes 
places and does things that we would prefer to 
keep private. Ordinarily we can protect our 
privacy by insuring that we are not being fol-
lowed, and that others do not know where we 
are going. The beeper destroys our ability to 
protect the privacy of our movement. (6 28 
F.2d at 949 (emphasis in original).) 
~ 
This position is too broad. It would call into question 
even the use of ordinary visual surveillance by the police, at 
least where the person exhibited some sign that he did not wish 
to be followed. Cf. Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy, and 
16. 
the Fourth Amendment, 86 Yale L.J. 1461, 1494 n.l45 (1977} (ar-
gues for a right of privacy in movement, then states that this 
"suggests that even long-term visual surveillance may result in a 
search subject to Fourth Amendment warrant requirements."} It 
would be fairly disastrous for the Court to adopt a theory of 
privacy that might raise in every case the question whether the 
person's public activities were protected under the Fourth Amend-
ment. 
/I 
It is possible, however, to articulate a different theory 
that emphasizes the very efficiency with which a beeper enables 
the Government to keep track of someone, and thus would not ex-
tend to ordinary means of surveillance. The courts that have 
adopted this view generally have argued that although a person in 
public has no reasonable expectation of going unobserved, he may 
well expect that there is no special means of tailing him. Cf. 
United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112 (CAl 1977} ("While a 
driver has no claim to be free from observation while driving in 
public, he properly can expect not to be carrying around an unin-
vited device that continuously signals his presence."} 
This emphasis on subjective expectations, of course, some-
what begs the question whether his expectation is reasonable. If 
the law determines that the use of beepers is unobjectionable, 
then the expectation can be ignored. Because of this problem of 
circularity, the issue ultimately must be determined through a 
"normative inquiry," Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 740 n.5., 
into the legitimacy of these privacy expectations -- what society 
is prepared to say should be expected. The argument here is that 
17. 
society is not prepared to expect that personal public movements 
may be subjected to pervasive monitoring through electronic 
surveillance devices. 
Concedely, there is not much authority for such a proposi-
tion. The most analogous argument was presented in Justice Har- ;{!~~ 
lan's dissent in United States v. White, 401 u.s. 745 (1971). In 
that case the Court upheld a conviction based on testimony by 
government agents who, without a warrant, listened to statements 
made by the defendant to an informer wearing a microphone. (The 
informer could not be located, necessitating testimony by the 
agents.) In a dissent based largely on concerns about the rise 
of the "Orwellian Big Brother," id. at 770, Justice Harlan ex-
pressed concern that warrantless third-party bugging might "un-
dermine that confidence and sense of security in dealing with one 
another that is characteristic of individual relationships be-
tween citizens of a free society." Id. at 787. He believed that 
there were crucial differences between testimony by the informant 
and third-party monitoring. 
My analysis is similar, though I do not suggest that Justice 
Harlan necessarily was correct in White. Justice White's plural-
ity opinion in White reasonably argued that it was unlikely that 
~ 
~ 
a person engaged in criminal activities "would distinguish be- J.o 
~~ tween probable informers on the one hand and probable informers 
with transmitters on the other." Id. at 752. In other words, 
the danger of permitting warrantless recording by an informer was 
quite limited; the informer still had to get the person to talk 
directly to him. The same would be true if a person's traveling 
18. 
companion wore a beeper. Since the person "consents" to his com-
panion's continuous knowledge of his location, warrantless use of 
the beeper, like use of the transmitting device in White, would 
be permissible. The potential for harassment through such a use 
of beepers is limited because the informant has to obtain this 
"consent" to travel with the person. 
Beepers normally are not used, however, by an informant 
traveling with the suspect. In the usual case, where there is no~ 
"consent" I thl.nk ~ to continuous knowledge of one's whereabouts, 
Justice Harlan's analysis has merit. I certainly do not wish to 
----------------~ 
._,_ 
recognize that electronic tracking devices may be anywhere and 
therefore that it is unreasonable to expect that my public move-
ments will not be monitored. Yet under the SG's view, there is ~ 
no limitation on the use of beepers. The police may use beepers~ 
on any person or property for any reason and for any length of 
time. The potential for harassment is substantial. It is this 
basic reaction, I believe, that explains why most CAs have been 
reluctant to hold that use of a beeper is entirely free from 
Fourth Amendment constraints. 
In response the SG notes that this position "reflects the 
view that our governmental institutions are incapable of control-
ling abuses of police activities if those activities are not held 
to be subject to judicial scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment. 
[This] exceedingly pessimistic vision . is far removed from 
the realities of contemporary American society." Reply Brief for 
us at 5. This is a fair statement, but I am of the view that the 
Fourth Amendment exists to protect privacy interests that other-
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wise might go unprotected in the legislative process. 
A more telling response, however, is that in prior Fourth 
Amendment decisions this Court has refused to use hypothetical 
police abuses as a reason for invalidating a warrantless surveil-
lance practice. The SG is correct that the "danger of abuse" 
type of argument sketched out above was made by Justice Marshall 
in dissent in Smith v. Maryland and by Justice Brennan in dissent 
in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (Powell, J.) 
(holding that there is no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in 
bank records) . 
A related response is that the proper remedy for this kind 
of invasion of privacy, which realistically differs from a tradi-
tiona! "search," is an action for damages and an injunction. 
This was the view of Chief Judge Clark, joined by other judges, 
concurring in United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (CAS 1981) 
(en bane) : 
Calling the attachment of a beeper to an auto-
mobile a search creates confusion at the out-
set -- it is neither a search nor a seizure. 
As importantly, extending the illogic of the 
exclusionary rule (which punishes society for 
the transgressions of errant police) to non-
search situations puts undue pressure on the 
courts to infringe the core right at issue --
the right to privacy. Where no search or sei-
zure is involved, pol ice a5r fagemen t of the 
r1ghF to privacy should be rectified as other 
similar constitutional infringements are 
through a private action against the errant 
officer. (645 F.2d at 259-60.) 
This is a reasonable argument, though I would note that it rests 
predominantly on the view that all Fourth Amendment violations 
properly are remedied through a lawsuit rather than through the 
exclusionary rule. 
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The only analogous example of which I am aware is a case 
used in first-year criminal law, Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 
366 (CA7 1964). The FBI conducted 24-hour surveillance on 
Giancana, a reputed mobster. For example, two to five cars al-
ways were outside his home to maintain surveillance or follow him 
around. He brought suit under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
for infringement of his rights to privacy and liberty. The DC 
granted a preliminary injunction (which required inter alia that 
"at least one foursome intervene between plaintiff and FBI agents 
when plaintiff plays golf" (!)). The CA7 dismissed the action -
for lack of $10,000 in controversy under 28 U.S.C. §1331. But 
the point is that this presumably is the type of remedy that 
might serve as a bulwark against the systematic and continuous 
use of beepers for purposes of harassment. And it also preserves 
the position that visual surveillance is not a search and thus 
does not require a warrant. 
I 
~ 
After weighing all of these arguments and counterarguments, 
the decision seems to come down to a choice between two very dif- &~~ 
ferent ways of looking at this situation. The~ is tha.!ie~,. 
since ~n has no expectation of privacy in his ~r his prop-
erty's Amovem~n~s, use of a beeper cannot be called a search. The - --A"'r___...... ~ 
~is that whatever the general lack of expectation of priva-
cy in public movements, people should not have to live with the 
risk that an electronic beeper may be used by the police as a 
means of pervasive and silent surveillance. Therefore, use of a 
beeper should be deemed a search. 
Writing on a clean slate, I would opt for the latter view. 
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I share Justice Harlan's concerns about the "Orwellian Big Broth-
er." The efficiency and secrecy with which electronic devices 
may be used are, in my view, powerful reasons for limiting their 
use to cases where the Government has a justifiable basis for 
believing that crimes are being committed. Reasonable arguments 
may be made that this problem should be dealt with by legislation 
or by private lawsuit brought under other constitutional amend-
ments, but I think the Fourth Amendment's traditional protection 
of personal privacy would make its application proper here. 
Under this Court's cases, however, I think the SG should 
~----------------------prevail. The Government's ability to discover the identity of 
f" 7" 
the persons to whom one has made phone calls is at least as in-
trusive on privacy as the Government's ability to follow a person ( ~-
~ or his property from one location to another. Yet the Court in ~J 
Smith v. Maryland accepted the Government's arguments about the 
limited nature of the intrusion and the lack of any precisely 
defined expectation of privacy, while rejecting the individual's 
arguments about the danger of governmental abuse of means of 
electronic surveillance. A similar balancing was made in favor 
of the Government in your opinion in United States v. Miller. 
And the Court in United States v. White rejected Justice Harlan's 
view that electronic surveillance, because of its unique charac-
ter, should be treated as invading privacy even where normal ~ 
means of surveillance would not invade that same privacy. Under 1'3;? W - ' ~ 
these decisions, the SG s~ correct that a beeper merely en-wg. 
hances the Government's ability to conduct visual surveillance, 
which invades no reasonable expectation of privacy and which 
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therefore is not a search. 
C. Need for a Warrant 
If monitoring a beeper is a search, there remains the ques-
tion whether a warrant is required. Some CAs have held that 
since the intrusion on privacy is limited, the Fourth Amendment 
is satisfied without regard to a warrant so long as there is some 
cause for using the beeper. An en banc§ plurality has held L"/l ~ 
that beeper monitoring is acceptable so long as the police have a ~~ 
"reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity. 
~I-~ 1 -~ -~~ --'~1 
United States v ~
Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (CAS 1981) (en bane) (11-3-10 decision)~.,. 
Th~ has held that monitoring of a beeper on private property 
requires a warrant, but that warrantless monitoring of a beeper 
located in public is valid if the police have probable cause. 
United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (CAl 1978). 
The motivation underlying these decisions is not hard to 
fathom. The CAs recognize that beepers are not very intrusive, 
but they are unwilling to authorize unlimited beeper use by de-
claring the Fourth Amendment entirely inapplicable. In my view, ~ 
however, if use of the beeper is to be governed by the Fourth ~ 
Amendment, the standard presumption in favor a warrant should be ~ 
applied. ~h.4U4.e. ~ 
Lo~ 
The SG argues that requiring a warrant prior to use of a 
beeper would not serve any purpose. He contends that ::_t: ~­
place restrictions on monitoring a beeper are impractical, and .56-
~ 
that since the intrusion is slight, any abuse can be controlled 
adequately through post-search judicial review. He also argues 
-. 
23. 
that requiring a warrant will increase the cost and therefore 
reduce the effectiveness of using beepers. Finally, the "princi-
pal cost would be a dilution of the effectiveness of the warrant 
procedure itself," because requiring warrants for minor intru-
sions on Fourth Amendment interests will trivialize the warrant 
procedure. Brief for US at 39. 
I am not convinced by these arguments. The exceptions to 
the warrant requirement have been "'jealously and carefully 
drawn.'" Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 u.s. 753, 759 (1980) (Powell, 
J.) (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958)). 
The Court has not held that the limited nature of the intrusion 
alone suffices to excuse the police from obtaining a warrant. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), for example, was based on both 
the limited intrusion on privacy and the obvious impracticality 
of obtaining a warrant prior to a stop and frisk. 
With respect to bee£ers, there is no decent argument that -




almost always will be part of a planned operation. Securi~~ 
warrant therefore does not detract from the efficacy of the beep-
er. In this case, for example, the police had to obtain the com-
pany's consent to substitute the drum containing the beeper for 
the normal container that would have been used. The only thing /~.~ . 
)t V--t 
saved by not obtaining a warrant was the officer's time. Time,~~ 
~"' 
of course, sometimes may be of the essence, but in those circum-
stances the exigent circumstances doctrine can sustain the war-
rantless use of a beeper. If the use of a beeper impinges on 
Fourth Amendment interests, as I assume in this section, then the 
24. 
warrant requirement should apply. 
D. Result in this Case 
If the Court determines that the warrantless use of the 
beeper violated resp's Fourth Amendment rights, it might consider 
whether his conviction necessarily should be reversed. Put sim-
The first thing to note is that the situation is only some-
what analogous to Illinois v. Gates. In both cases the police 
obtained and executed a search warrant, and the issue is whether 
there was probable cause to support the warrant. But in Gates 
the issue is simply whether there was enough evidence to justify 
the warrant; there is no suggestion that the police committed any 
illegal activity. Here, in contrast, the warrant presumably 
hinged on the validity of the evidence uncovered through use of 
the beeper. Therefore, though the deterrent rationale of the 
exclusionary rule does not apply to the police in Gates, it still 
may apply here. _____., 
One still can make an argument for a good faith exception in 
this case. The argument works by analogy to 
sions refusing to apply new Fourth Amendment 
tively. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 
this Court's deci- ~ 
decisions retroac-
394 u.s. 244 (1969} 
(holding that Katz v. United States should be applied prospec-
tively only}. If the police in good faith believed that warrant-
less use of the beeper was constitutional, then the deterrent 
function of the exclusionary rule is sufficiently served by ap-
25. 
plying the warrant requirement to cases arising in the future. 
At the time of the "beeper search" here it was an open ques-
tion whether a warrant was needed. Several CAs had held that 
warrantless use of the beeper was valid in some circumstances. 
One can see a problem, however, in applying a good faith standard 
to a situation where the CAs were in conflict. Would warrantless 
use of a beeper be in good faith in one circuit but not in anoth-
er, depending on the holding of the relevant CA? Certainly the 
police reasonably could have been aware of the controversy over 
beepers and thus perhaps should have erred on the side of caution 
by obtaining a warrant. Thus, I am not sure this would be a good I 
case in which to recognize or apply a good faith exception, 
though I think the possibility remains for consideration. ~ 
~
III. Conclusion 
Unless the Court is willing to alter its analysis of elec-
tronic surveillance devices generally, I recommend that the CAS 
be reversed. 
1. The critical question is whether use of a beeper consti-
J( ,, 4" 
tutes a search. t!: 
2. Two types of analysis have been used on this question: 
(1) what is the nature of the object to which the beeper was at-
tached; (2) what was the location of the object when the police 
were monitoring the beeper. 
3. On the nature of the object, the key distinction is be-
tween contraband and lawfully-possessed property. 
a. One might analogize precursor chemicals to contra-
26. 
band. 
b. It would be difficult, however, to draw a line be-
tween lawful property and property that was intended for use in a 
crime. 
c. Moreover, the issue is not whether there is an ex-
'-------
pectation of privacy in a particular piece of property (i.e., the ~ 
contraband itself), but whether there is a valid expectation of 
? 
privacy in a private location, such as resp's residence. 
4. On the location of the object, the usual distinction is 
between monitoring a beeper in public to assist surveillance and 
monitoring a beeper to determine the location of an item on pri-
vate premises. 
a. This distinction is plausible, given that generally 
one has a greater expectation of privacy in, say, a private resi-
dence than in a car on the public roads. 
b. But the distinction does not work well with beepers. 
The point of monitoring a beeper is to determine the destination~ 
of a pe~n or object. It should make little difference whether 
- o_._;,..-
or not the monitoring happens to occur while the beeper moves 
onto private property, since the intrusion on privacy differs 
little as between the two situations. 
5. The crucial issue therefore becomes whether use of a 17...._ 
beeper for any purpose of surveillance constitutes a search. 
a. The SG makes a strong argument that the beeper mere-
ly enhances visual surveillance, which does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment since a person does not have an expectation of 
privacy in his public travels. This is consistent with Smith v. 
27. 
Maryland. 
b. The countervailing argument arises from a belief 
that electronic devices are especially pernicious and therefore 
should be treated as intruding on expectations of privacy even 
where such expectations are not violated by other forms of sur-
veillance. 
c. I prefer the latter view, believing that the Fourth 
Amendment should apply to use of electronic devices that invade 
to even a small degree of personal privacy. 
d. My preferred view, however, has been rejected in 
recent cases. Unless the Court is willing to reconsider those 
opinions in favor of an approach similar to Justice Harlan's in 
dissent in United States v. White, the proper result is that use 
of beepers does not constitute a search. 
"----- '\' 
/( 
6. If use of beepers 1s a search, the remaining question is 
...... 
whether a warrant should be required. 
a. Some CAs have held that a warrant is not required, 
reasoning that where the intrusion on privacy is minimal a war-
rant is not necessary. 
b. The Court's opinions, however, suggest that a war-
rant should be required except where there are clear and strong 
reasons for making an exception. 
c. The police have sufficient opportunity to obtain a 
warrant to use beepers, since beepers normally are part of a 
planned operation. The SG's argument essentially is that it is ..__ ______ __ 
burdensome for the police to obtain a warrant and that this bur-
den is too heavy given the minimal intrusions on privacy. This 
28. 
is not sufficient under this Court's precedent. 
7. If the warrantless use of the beeper was unconstitutional 
in this case, the Court might consider applying a good faith ex-
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MEMO TO FILE 
81-1802 United States v. Knotts 
The central issue is whether use of a beeper for 
any purpose of surveillance constitutes a search. 
The SG's Answer: 
Use of a beeper merely enchances visual 
surveillance, e.g., "tailing" a suspect, using binoculars, 
staking out a dwelling. The SG argues that one has no 
expectation of privacy in his public travels. 
The SG's position is strongly supported by HAB's 
opinion in Smith v. Maryland, sustaining the validity of 
placing a "pen register" on one's telephone to identify the 
origin of phone calls. Byron's opinion in United States v. 
White (government agents, without a warrant, may listen to 
statements made by a suspected person to an informer wearing 
a microphone) also supports the SG. My opinion in Miller, 
with respect to bank records, is somewhat supportive. 
Warrant Should be Required: 
Justice Harlan's dissent in White makes the best 
case for a warrant (his famous "Orwellian Big Brother" 
concern). Under the SG's view, there is no limitation on 
-~~fw/+-k~~ 
the use of beeper ~. Police could, rrl.east arguably, use ~ ~T 
beepers on persons or property for any reason and for any)~ 
length of time. Unlike other visual means of surveillance ~ 
~ 
the very efficiency and secrecy of beepers would enable 
2. 
government to monitor the movement of persons and their 
property far more extensively and secretly. 
Possible Middle Grounds: 
CAS, plurality en bane in u.s. v. Michael (1981) 
held that beeper monitoring is acceptable when police have a 
"reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity. CAl would 
require warrantless monitoring by a beeper in public (as 
distinguished from a private dwelling) is valid if police 
have probable cause. 
If, however, the use of beepers is a search (as ~ 
Justice Harlan would have held), it is logically difficult ~ 
to say that a warrant is not required. There always will be ~ 
close questions of fact as to whether there is "reasonable ~...- 11 
,,~ 
suspicion" or "probable cause". 
The SG argues that obtaining a warrant would be 
impractical because of the variations in time and place. 
Thus, there could not be the particularized type of warrant 
that is required to tap a telephone. It can be answered 
that beepers normally are part of a planned operation~ It 
may not be really burdensome, where police have enough 
grounds of suspicion to plan such an operation, to require a 
warrant. Of course, the usual exception with respect to 
exigent circumstances would obtain. 
3. 
This Case: 
Arguably, we might try to apply some sort of "good 
faith" exception here as the police probably acted in 
perfectly good faith. In Illinois v. Gates, to be reargued, 
the issue is whether there was enough evidence to justify 
the warrant, and thus no illegal activity by police. Here, 
in contrast, if a beeper is a search within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment, the deterrent rationale of the 
Exclusionary Rule should apply. 
In any event, if the Court held that a warrant is 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-1802 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. 
LEROY CARLTON KNOTTS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1983] 
Jus'}}CE REHNQUIST delivered the Opinion of the Court 
A 'beeW! is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, 
which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio 
receiver. In this case, a beeper was placed in a five gallon 
drum containi~g;hloroform purchased by one of respondent's 
codefendants. 'VBy monitoring the progress of a car carrying 
the chloroform Minnesota law e ement agents were able 
to trace the can of chlorofo fro 'ts lace of urchase in 
Mi · , inne§Qta o espondent's secluded cabin near 
Shell Lake, Wisconsin. The 1ssue presented by tfie case is 
whetfier suchuse of a beeper violated respondent's rights se-
cured by the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
I 
Respondent and two codefendants were charged in the 
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota 
with conspiracy to manufacture controlled substances, in-
cluding but not limited to methamphetamine, in violation of 
21 U. S. C. § 846 (1976). One of the codefendants, Darryl 
Petschen, was tried jointly with respondent; the other co-
defendant, Tristan Armstrong, pleaded guilty and testified 
for the government at trial. 
Suspicion attached to this trio when the 3M Company, 
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which manufactures chemicals in St. Paul, notified a narcotics 
investigator for the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehen-
sion that Armstrong, a former 3M employee, had been steal-
ing chemicals which could be used in manufacturing illicit 
drugs. Visual surveillance of Armstrong revealed that after 
leaving the employ of 3M Company, he had been purchasing 
similar chemicals from the Hawkins Chemical Company in 
Minneapolis. The Minnesota narcotics officers observed 
that after Armstrong had made a purchase, he would deliver 
the chemicals to codefendant Petschen. 
With the consent of the Hawkins Chemical Company, offi-
cers installed a beeper inside a five gallon container of chloro-
form, one of the so called "precursor" chemicals used to man-
ufacture illicit drugs. Hawkins agreed that when 
Armstrong next purchased chloroform, the chloroform would 
be placed in this particular container. When Armstrong 
made the purchase, officers followed the car in which the 
chloroform had been placed, maintaining contact by using 
both visual surveillance and a monitor which received the sig-
nals sent from the beeper. 
Armstrong proceeded to Petschen's house, where the con-
tainer was transferred to Petschen's automobile. Officers 
then followed that vehicle eastward towards the state line, 
across the St. Croix River, and into Wisconsin. During the 
latter part of this journey, Petschen began making evasive 
maneuvers, and the pursuing agents ended their visual sur-
veillance. At about the same time officers lost the signal 
from the beeper, but with the assistance of a monitoring de-
vice located in a helicopter the approximate location of the 
signal was picked up again about one hour later. The signal 
now was stationary and the location identified was a cabin oc-
cupied by respondent near Shell Lake, Wisconsin. The 
record before us does not reveal that the beeper was used 
after the location in the area of the cabin had been initially 
determined. 
81-1802-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. KNO'ITS 3 
Relying on the location of the chloroform derived through 
the use of the beeper and additional information obtained 
during three days of visual surveillance of respondent's cabin, 
officers secured a search warrant. During execution of the 
warrant, officers discovered a fully operable, clandestine 
drug laboratory in the cabin. In the laboratory area officers 
found formulas for amphetamine and methamphetamine, 
over $10,000 worth oflaboratory equipment, and chemicals in 
quantities sufficient to produce 14 pounds of pure ampheta-
mine. Under a barrel outside the cabin, officers located the 
five gallon container of chloroform. 
After his motion to suppress evidence based on the war-
rantless monitoring of the beeper was denied, respondent 
was convicted for conspiring to manufacture controlled sub-
stances in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846 (1976). He was sen-
tenced to five years imprisonment. A divided panel of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
versed the conviction, finding that the monitoring of the 
beeper was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment because its ~ 
use had violated respondent's reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, and that all information derived after the location of the 
cabin was a fruit of the illegal beeper monitoring.* -- F. 
*Respondent does not challenge the warrantless installation of the 
beeper in the chloroform container, suggesting in oral argument that he did 
not believe he had standing to make such a challenge. We note that 
while several Courts of Appeals have approved warrantless installations, 
see United States v. Bernard, 625 F. 2d 854 (CA9 1980); United States v. 
Lewis, 621 F. 2d 1382 (CA5 1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 935 (1981); 
United States v. Bruneau, 594 F. 2d 1190 (CAS), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 
847 (1979); United States v. Miroyan, 577 F. 2d 489 (CA9), cert. denied, 
439 U. S. 896 (1978); United States v. Cheshire, 569 F. 2d 887 (CA5), cert. 
denied, 437 U. S. 907 (1978); United States v. Curtis, 562 F. 2d 1153 (CA9 
1977), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 910 (1978); United States v. Abel, 548 F. 2d 
591 (CA5), cert. denied, 431 U. S. 956 (1977); United States v. Hufford, 539 
F. 2d 32 (CA9), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1002 (1976), we have not before and 
do not now pass on the issue. We also note that the government has not, 
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2d -- (1981). We granted certiorari, -- U. S. , 
(1982), and we now reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
II 
In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928), this 
Court held that the wiretapping of a defendant's private tele-
phone line did not violate the Fourth Amendment because 
the wiretapping had been effectuated without a physical tres-
pass by the government. Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice 
Stone, dissented from that decision, believing that the ac-
tions of the government in that case constituted an "unjustifi-
able intrusion ... upon the privacy of the individual," and 
therefore a violation of the Fourth Amendment. I d. ,~t 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Nearly forty years later, · Katz 
v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), the Court ove ed 
Olmstead saying that the Fourth Amendment's reach "can-
not turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion 
into any given enclosure." 389 U. S., at 353. The Court 
said: 
"The Government's activities in electronically listening 
to and recording the petitioner's words violated the pri-
vacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the 
telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and sei-
zure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve 
that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the 
booth can have no constitutional significance." Id. 
In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735 (1979), we elaborated 
on the principles stated in Katz: 
in this Court, challenged respondent's standing to maintain the Fourth 
Amendment claim which he has raised and, therefore, for purposes of this 
decision we assume standing. 
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"Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held 
that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends 
on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a 
'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of 
privacy' that has been invaded by government action. 
[Citations omitted]. This inquiry, as Mr. Justice Harlan 
aptly noted in his Katz concurrence, normally embraces 
two discrete questions. The first is whether the individ-
ual, by his conduct, has 'exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy,' 389 U. S., at 361-whether, in 
the words of the Katz majority, the individual has shown 
that 'he seeks to preserve [something] as private.' !d., 
at 351. The second question is whether the individual's 
subjective expectation of privacy is 'one that society is 
prepared to recognize as "reasonable,"' id., at 361-
whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individ-
ual's expectation, viewed objectively, is 'justifiable' 
under the circumstances. !d., at 353. See Rakas v. Il-
linois, 439 U. S., at 143--144, n. 12; id., at 151 (concur-
ring opinion); United States v. White, 401 U. S., at 752 
(plurality opinion)." 442 U. S., at 740-741 (footnote 
omitted). 
The governmental surveillance conducted by means of the 
beeper in this case amounted principally to the following of an 
automobile on public streets and highways. We have com-
mented more than once on the diminished expectation of pri-
vacy in an automobile: 
~sser expectation of privacy in a motor vehi-
cle because its function is transportation and it seldom 
serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal 
effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public 
scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its 
occupants and its contents are in plain view." Cardwell 
v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality). See also 
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/,_as v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 153-154, and n. 2 (1978) 
v{p~~ELL, J., concurring); South Dakota v. Opperman, 
428 u. s. 364, 368 (1976). 
A person travelling in an automobile on public thorough-
fares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his move-
ments from one place to another. When Petschen travelled 
over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone 
who wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over par-
ticular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever 
stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he 
exited from public roads onto private property. Visual sur-
veillance from public places along his route would have suf-
ficed to reveal these facts to the police. The fact that the 
officers in this case relied not only on visual surveillance, but 
on the use of the beeper to signal the presence of Petschen's 
automobile to the police receiver, does not alter the situation. 
Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from 
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at 
birth with such enhancement as science and technology may 
afford. In United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559 (1927), the 
Court said: 
"But no search on the high seas is shown. The testi-
mony of the boatswain shows that he used a searchlight. 
It is not shown that there was any exploration below 
decks or under hatches. For aught that appears, the 
cases of liquor were on deck and, like the defendants, 
were discovered before the motor boat was boarded. 
Such use of a searchlight is comparable to the use of a 
marine glass or a field .glass. It is not prohibited by the 
Constitution." I d., at 563. 
We have recently had occasion to deal with another claim 
which was to some extent a factual counterpart of respond-
ent's assertions here. In Smith v. Maryland, supra, we 
said: 
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"This analysis dictates that [Smith] can claim no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy here. When he used his 
phone, [Smith] voluntarily conveyed numerical informa-
tion to the telephone company and 'exposed' that in-
formation to its equipment in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. In so doing, [Smith] assumed the risk that the 
company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed. 
The switching equipment that processed those numbers 
is merely the modern counterpart of the operator who, in 
an earlier day, personally completed calls for the sub-
scriber. [Smith] concedes that if he had placed his calls 
through an operator, he could claim no legitimate expec-
tation of privacy. [Citation omitted]. We are not in-
clined to hold that a different constitutional result is re-
quired because the telephone company has decided to 
automate." 442 U. S., at 744-745. 
Respondent does not actually quarrel with this analysis, 
though he expresses the generalized view that the result of 
the holding sought by the government would be that 
"twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country 
will be possible, without judicial knowledge or supervision." 
Br. for Resp., at 9 (footnote omitted). But the fact is that 
the "reality hardly suggests abuse," Zurcher v. Stanford 
Daily, 436 U. S. 547, 566 (1978); respondent was ·not just 
"any citizen," and if such dragnet type law enforcement prac-
tices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there 
will be time enough then to determine whether different con-
stitutional principles may be applicable. I d. Insofar as re-
spondent's complaint appears to be simply that scientific de-
vices such as the beeper enabled the police to be more 
effective in detecting crime, it simply has no constitutional 
foundation. We have never equated police efficiency with 
unconstitutionality, and we decline to do so now. 
Respondent specifically attacks the use of the beeper inso-
far as it was used to determine that the can of chloroform had 
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come to rest on his property at Shell Lake, Wisconsin. He 
repeatedly challenges the "use of the beeper to determine the 
location of the chemical drum at Respondent's premises," Br. 
for Resp., at 26; he states that "[t]he government thus over-
looks the fact that this case involves the sanctity of Respond-
ent's residence, which is accorded the greatest protection 
available under the Fourth Amendment." I d. The Court of 
Appeals appears to have rested its decision on this ground: 
"As noted above, a principal rationale for allowing war-
rantless tracking of beepers, particularly beepers in or 
on an auto, is that beepers are merely a more effective 
means of observing what is already public. But people 
pass daily from public to private spheres. When police 
agents track bugged personal property without first ob-
taining a warrant, they must do so at the risk that this 
enhanced surveillance, intrusive at best, might push for-
tuitously and unreasonably into the private sphere pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment." Pet., at 6a. 
We think that respondent's contentions, and the above 
quoted language from the opinion of the Court of Appeals, to 
some extent lose sight of the limited use which the govern-
ment made of the signals from this particular beeper. As we 
have noted, nothing in this record indicates that the beeper 
signal was received or relied upon after it had indicated that 
the drum containing the chloroform had ended its automotive 
journey at rest on respondent's premises in rural Wisconsin. 
Admittedly, because of the failure of the visual surveillance, 
the beeper enabled the law enforcement officials in this case 
to ascertain the ultimate resting place of the chloroform when 
they would not have been able to do so had they relied solely 
on their naked eyes. But scientific enhancement of this sort 
raises no constitutional issues which visual surveillance 
would not also raise. A police car following Petschen at a 
distance throughout his journey could have observed him 
leaving the public highway and arriving at the cabin owned 
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by respondent, with the drum of chloroform still in the car. 
This fact, along with others, was used by the government in 
obtaining a search warrant which led to the discovery of the 
clandestine drug laboratory. But there is no indication that 
the beeper was used in any way to reveal information as to 
the movement of the drum within the cabin, or in any way 
that would not have been visible to the naked eye from out-
side the cabin. Just as notions of physical trespass based on 
the law of real property were not dispositive in Katz, supra, 
neither were they dispositive in Hester v. United States, 265 
u. s. 57 (1924). 
We thus return to the question posed at the beginning of 
our inquiry in discussing Katz, supra; did monitoring the 
beeper signals complained of by respondent invade any legiti-
mate expectation of privacy on his part? For the reasons 
previously stated, we hold they did not. Since they did not, 
there was neither a "search" nor a "seizure" within the 
contemplation of the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of 
the Court of Appeals is therefore 
Reversed. 
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Re: 81-1802 - United States v. Knotts 
Dear Bill: 
While I agree with your conclusion, I am inclined 
to think that some of the statements in your opinion 
are broader than necessary. Let me identify those that 
trouble me. 
On page 6, you state that a person travelling in 
an automobile on public thoroughfares has "no" 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from 
one place to another. It seems to me that that 
statement is somewhat exaggerated. When one of us 
takes his family on a vacation, leaving early in the 
morning for an unannounced destination, I think we do 
not expect the general public to know where we are 
going or why. The fact that a detective might 
successfully follow us without our knowledge does not, 
it seems to me, totally foreclose· the expectation that 
a private vacation would normally be a private matter. 
Later on page 6, you state that nothing in the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from augmenting 
the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with 
such enhancement as science and technology may afford. 
But if sophisticated listening devices would enable 
officers to overhear private conversations that take 
place within an automobile, it seems rather clear that 
the Fourth Amendment might be violated. Indeed, isn't 
that what Katz holds? 
On page 7, you suggest that respondent was not 
just "any citizen," but I should have thought he was 
entitled to the protections of any other citizen until 
the police had probable cause to conduct a search. 
Toward the bottom of page 7, you make the 
:Ji ~ment, si~ !lttlCI z age 6, that the 
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of scientific devices to make the police more effective 
in detecting crime does not give rise to any 
constitutional problem. Again, as in the case of 
sophisticated listening devices, I do not believe I can 
agree. (There is a similar overstatement toward the 
bottom of page 8 about "scientific enhancement" raising 
no constitutional issues that visual surveillance would 
not also raise.) 
Finally, in your concluding sentence you state 
that there was neither a "search" nor a "seizure." It 
would seem to me that the more correct analysis is that 
even if surveillance, whether visual or electronic, 
constitutes a search, the intrusion associated with 
following a car on the public roads is virtually always 
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
In this case I would say that even if there may have 
been a search--after all, the police did spend about an 
hour trying to locate the missing car--that it was 
perfectly reasonable, especially since there is no 
question about the legitimacy of the installation of 
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Insofar as your example of a family leaving for a 
vacation in a car which is driven on a public thoroughfare, 
I stand by the statement in the circulating draft that there 
is no reasonable expectation of priv~cy in their movements 
along the highway. 
I agree that any citizen, whether Knotts or anyone 
else, is entitled to the protections of the Fourth · 
Amendment; but insofar as travel in a licensed vehicle along 
a public highway is concerned, I do not think that he or any 
citizen suffers any deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights 
when he is visually observed by the police. 
I agree with your suggestion that the language which 
you refer to on page 6 might be taken to reach devices which 
would enable officers to overhear private conversations that 
take place within an automobile, though it is certainly not 
intended to pass judgment on such devices. Accordingly, I 
will change the sentence beginning "Nothing in the Fourth 
Amendment" on page 6 so as to read: 
"Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the 
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I would like very much to be able to join your opinion. 
I am certainly with you in the judgment. One thing, however, 
bothers me. On page 6, first full paragraph, next to the 
last line, could you see your way clear to end the sentence 
with the word "cabin" and eliminate the citation of the 
Hester case? 
I do not regard the Knotts case as an open fields one. 
Further, we shall probably take an open fields case for argu-
ment, and I, for one, am a little reluctant to lay the ground 
work here for a decision in whatever case we take. Hester, 
of course, is also cited on page 9 of your opinion. I wish 
we could eliminate that citation, too. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
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Dear Bill: 
You have probably seen my letter to Harry, responding to a 
request similar to that contained in your letter of January 17th. 
The only reason I voted to grant certiorari in Florida v. Brady, 
which was an opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida expressing 
the view that United States v. Hester was no longer the law, 
was because I felt there was no warrant in this Court's cases 
for the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of Florida. 
The present draft of my opinion in this case conforms to what 
I believe to be the state of the law on this subject. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
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